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p ALESTINE AND ISRAEL: A CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE. By John 
Quigley. Durham: Duke University Press. 1990. Pp. v, 232. Cloth, 
$42.50; paper, $18.95. 
On the eve of the Persian Gulf War, French President Francois 
Mitterrand made a hopeful gesture to avert the multinational war with 
Iraq: if Iraq withdrew from Kuwait, he implied, an "International 
Peace Conference" would address the problems of the region. 1 Of 
course, Mitterrand's efforts failed in the face of President George 
Bush's objection to any possible linkage with the Arab-Israeli prob-
lem, and the ensuing Persian Gulf War initially dimmed the prospects 
of a regional peace conference. Now, in the aftermath of the war, 
those prospects are suddenly brighter.2 
Should a conference ensue, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in partic-
ular Israel's conflict with the Palestinians, will likely dominate the 
agenda. The outcome of negotiations may depend upon whether the 
parties can agree on the rights of Israelis and Palestinians as a matter 
of international law. The problem may be an intractable one, but ad-
vocates of each position will not lack the resources of legal scholar-
ship. 3 Few international conflicts have received so much attention, 
and the writing continues. In Palestine and Israel: A Challenge to 
Justice, Professor John Quigley4 contributes the latest addition. 
Quigley focuses primarily on the competing claims to the various 
lands of Palestine. Like Henry Cattan, author of a similarly titled 
1. Ibrahim, France Will Pursue Peace Till 16th. Mitte"and Says, N.Y. Times, Jan 10, 1991, 
at AS, col. 1. On January 14, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas formalized the appeal as a 
six-point initiative, under which the U.N. Security Council would "make 'an active contribution' 
to [a settlement ot] the Palestinian issue by convening 'at the appropriate moment' an interna-
tional conference to assure 'the security, stability and development of this region of the world.' " 
Lewis, France and 3 Arab States Issue an Appeal to Hussein, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1991, at Al2, 
col. 1. 
2. At the time of this writing, Secretary of State Baker had gone to Israel to discuss resolving 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
3. Some of the more recent and important works are N. FEINBERG, STUDIES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1979); MILITARY GoVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY 
lsRAEL 1967-1980: THE LEGAL AsPECfS (M. Shamgar ed. 1982); B. MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF 
THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, 1947-1949 (1987); N. SAFRAN, ISRAEL THE EMBAT-
TLED ALLY (2d ed. 1981); S. SANDLER & H. FRlscH, ISRAEL, THE PALESTINIANS, AND THE 
WFSr BANK (1984); R. SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S LAW: lsRAEL AND THE WFSr BANK (1985); J. 
STONE, lsRAEL AND PALESTINE: AssAULT ON THE LAW OF NATIONS (1981); and J. WEILER, 
lsRAEL AND THE CREATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE (1985), 
4. Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Political Science, The Ohio State University. 
Quigley contributed to PALESTINIAN RIGHTS: DENIAL AND AFFIRMATION (I. Abu-Lughad ed. 
1982), TREATMENT OF PALESTINIANS IN lsRAELI-0cCUPIED WFSr BANK AND GAZA: RE-
PORT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD 1977 MIDDLE EAST DELEGATION (1978). He has 
also written books about Soviet Law: H. BERMAN & J. QUIGLEY, BASIC LAWS ON THE STRUC-
TURE OF THE SOVIET STATE (1969); J. QUIGLEY, THE SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE MONOPOLY: 
INSTITUTIONS AND LAWS (1974). 
1800 
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work, 5 Quigley presents a series of Zionist violations of international 
law as rationale for challenging the validity of the Jewish title to Pales-
tine. Unlike Cattan, however, Quigley questions the legitimacy of the 
Israeli claim to Palestine by attacking Zionism itself. 6 Zionism and 
the Zionist state, Quigley argues, are colonialist, racist phenomena 
that have aggressively deprived Palestinians of their right to self-
determination. 
Unfortunately, the argument founders in the midst of a polemic 
style and occasionally haphazard organization. Also, Quigley often 
fails to differentiate clearly for the reader arguments he supports from 
those he merely intends to explain. Perhaps most importantly, debata-
ble characterizations of historical fact substantially undermine the 
strength of legal arguments dependent on historical analysis. 
Despite these flaws, Quigley succeeds in exposing the ugly side of 
the Jewish presence in the Middle East. Post-World War II film docu-
mentaries and contemporary literature had created a romanticized im-
age of the brave immigrant Jew who, against all odds, fought off the 
heathen, wicked Arabs to return to his or her desert and transform it 
into an Elysian paradise. Romanticized Israel recalled America's own 
frontier past, and the American public swooned. In radical contrast, 
Quigley bludgeons his audience with a litany of atrocities committed 
by the Jews against the Palestinians: the Jews stole, deceived, and dis-
criminated. Quigley's legal arguments may ultimately fail to convince 
many readers, but at least they surface as the product of some real 
grievances. 
The establishment and expansion of the state of Israel structures 
Quigley's presentation. First, the book investigates the original Zion-
ist settlement in Palestine from inception through United Nations Res-
olution 181, which authorized the division of Palestine into Arab and 
Jewish states (pp. 1-53). Here, Quigley questions the Jews' claim to 
the land that would form the original State of Israel. The Jewish set-
tlements in Palestine, he argues, can only be understood as a conse-
quence of tum-of-the-century imperialism and colonialism. Thus, the 
Jews deprived the Palestinians of their legal right to self-determination 
from the outset. The remainder of the book, which analyzes the ex-
pansion of the Jewish settlement via the establishment of Israel, the 
expansion of Israel into the West Bank and Gaza pursuant to the Six 
Day War of 1967, the Israeli treatment of Arabs, and solutions to the 
conflict, builds on this claim. 
Implicit in this approach, which traces the history of the Arab-
Israeli conflict in order to formu1ate a legal argument, is that yester-
5. H. CA'ITAN, PALESTINE, THE ARAlls AND lsRAEL: THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE (1969). 
6. Others before Quigley have used the same technique. See, e.g., CoLLOQUIUM OF ARAB 
JURISTS (1967), described and distinguished from Cattan in N. FEINBERG, supra note 3, at 516 
n.11. 
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day's facts affect today's rights. Because normative conclusions con-
cerning today's rights draw substantial strength from normative 
conclusions about yesterday's rights, it is not surprising that Quigley 
spends so much time explaining history.7 History creates and destroys 
rights. Elucidating rights ahistorically is the realm of politics and di-
plomacy, not international law. 
For Quigley and those with whom he jousts, therefore, it is impor-
tant, for example, whether or not the Jews were the aggressors in the 
1948 Israeli War of Independence. If the Jews really were the aggres-
sors in 1948, then it is easier to argue that Israel was also an aggressor 
in 1967, when the Israelis captured the West Bank and Gaza from 
Jordan in the Six Day War. In this line of argument, the Six Day War 
fits neatly into a pattern of Israeli aggression. If the War of Indepen-
dence should be viewed as a greedy grab of territory rather than the 
defense of a nascent and fragile country, it is not difficult to conclude 
that the Six Day War was another calculated step toward establishing 
a "Greater Israel," and that again Israel's justifications of self-defense 
were manufactured. Consequently, Israel's continued occupation of 
the West Bank and Gaza is aggressive, and therefore illegal. Another 
picture of the events in 1948 might suggest a different rubric under 
which to place the Six Day War. 
Accordingly, the debate between "pro-Palestinian" and "pro-Is-
raeli" commentators often focuses less on disagreements over what in-
ternational law is and more on characterizations of what really 
happened in 1948 and 1967. This is not to say that Quigley, or other 
commentators, do not hinge important arguments on characteriza-
tions of international law. Quigley, for example, debates Great Brit-
ain's legal obligations pursuant to the mandate it received from the 
League of Nations to administer Palestine after World War I (pp. 14-
17), the legal status ofU.N. General Assembly resolutions (pp. 47-53), 
ancient right as a basis for entitlement to land (pp. 66-72), and self-
determination as a right or merely a principle of international law (p. 
67). Ultimately, however, Quigley exerts more effort arguing over 
points of fact, such as whether the Jews who inhabit Israel today can 
truly claim to be the descendants of the Jews dispossessed of Israel by 
7. Compare Professor Weller's comments: 
Despite the abundance and diversity of contributions, there is a common trait unifying 
much of the legal scholarship [on the Arab-Israeli conflict]. With some notable exceptions, 
legal writers and lawyers have tended to address past events with a view toward determining 
legal rights and wrongs. Thus, law and legal scholarship have been used primarily to con-
duct a normative evaluation of the parties' political acts and claims. This tendency of schol-
arly commentary derives from the very nature of the discipline. Municipal legal scholarship 
and law, especially in the common-law world, have long been dominated by judicial process 
whose main purpose has been to adjudicate between conflicting parties to determine their 
legal rights and duties. This post facto determination is meant, of course, to have ramifica-
tions for the future, as it is through adjudication that parties resolve their conflicts -
wrongs must be undone and rights must be vindicated. 
J. WEILER, supra note 3, at 42-43 (footnotes omitted). 
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the Romans almost 2,000 years ago (pp. 68-71), and characterizing the 
true intentions of Jewish leaders such as David Ben-Gurion (p. 42) 
with the apparent purpose of attributing such intentions to all of 
Zionism. 
The crux of Quigley's legal argument is that the establishment and 
expansion of Israel has violated the Palestinians' right to self-determi-
nation, which in turn violates international law. If Quigley is correct 
that Israel was the aggressor in 1948 and 1967, the argument is strong, 
because each war resulted in Israel's occupation of territory outside its 
borders and the subsequent dispossession of thousands of Palestinians. 
But arguing that the establishment of Israel violated the Palestinians 
right to self-determination is more difficult. 
In order to reinforce this latter claim, Quigley characterizes the 
original Jewish settlements in Palestine as colonialist endeavors. The 
Palestinians, Quigley argues, were deprived of their land by imperialist 
powers such as the United States and Great Britain to serve their self-
ish geopolitical interests rather than moral or legal interests. In this 
regard, Quigley emphasizes that Zionism emerged during the colonial 
division of Africa (p. 6) from a minority block in the Jewish commu-
nity (p. 12). The British endorsed the concept of a Jewish national 
home in Palestine not because they felt Jewish nationalism deserved 
any moral backing, but as a cynical attempt to protect the strategic 
interests of the British empire (pp. 8-9). Furthermore, the United Na-
tions never would have endorsed the partition of Palestine into Arab 
and Jewish parts but for the American arm-twisting of General As-
sembly delegates and a collective consciousness of guilt for the Holo-
caust; there was no international, collective feeling that the Jews had a 
right to the land allocated to them by partition (p. 37). The original 
settlement in Israel, despite its background in the oppression of Jews 
in Europe, can only be seen as a colony; partition can only be seen as a 
farce. 
Yet Quigley never establishes that the Jewish actions, even if colo-
nialist, violated the Palestinians' legal right to self-determination. 
This failure ensues primarily from Quigley's refusal to define self-de-
termination, or to explain how this term relates to the right to control 
land. Quigley never reconciles, for example, the premise that the 
Palestinians could claim title because they are the native inhabitants 
(p. 68) with his admission that physical control of a territory is an 
important basis for a claim of title (pp. 67, 72). Later, he suggests that 
possession must be peaceful and uncontested in order for title to vest, 
implying that control really is not important after all (p. 92). If 
Quigley is correct, not only does Israel hold invalid title now, but its 
predecessors, Great Britain (through the League of Nations) and the 
Ottoman Empire, never held valid claims to Palestine either: the pos-
session by each was contested by the indigenous inhabitants. Some 
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might accept this argument. But if title belonged to the Palestinians 
all along because they are a distinct people (pp. 73-74) on their own 
land, does the Palestinian claim encompass parts of Jordan and Leba-
non that are also predominantly Palestinian?8 Quigley leaves unclear 
just how far he would have the right of self-determination extend over 
territory. 
Regardless of the legal status of the right to self-determination, the 
inquiry as to whether the right was violated turns mainly on questions 
of fact. For example, to support further the legal argument that the 
Zionists' claim to Palestine was invalid as a colonialist expropriation 
of territory, Quigley marshals historical evidence showing that most 
violence in the pre-Israel era was perpetrated by Jews with the main 
purpose of forcing the natives from their land (pp. 40-46). Jewish acts 
of terrorism receive extensive description,9 while Arab participation in 
the violence is virtually ignored. 
When he does mention Arab violence, Quigley gives chronically 
misleading descriptions. Consider, for example, Quigley's description 
of the Arab posture after the passage of U.N. Resolution 141, during 
British preparations to leave Palestine: "The Arab Higher Committee 
planned no major military action before British withdrawal, now 
scheduled for May 1948. But local Arab irregulars loyal to the Arab 
Higher Committee staged armed attacks on transport convoys that 
carried supplies to Zionist settlements and Jewish-populated towns" 
(p. 40; footnote omitted). 
In fact, the military leader of the Arab Higher Committee, Abdul 
Khader Husseini, proceeding on the direction of the Committee's 
leader, Haj Amin Al Husseini, had put the city of Jerusalem under 
siege.10 The predominantly Jewish population of Jerusalem was sup-
plied mainly by convoys along the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem Road. 11 Abdul 
Khader, with the aid of local irregulars, persistently attacked these 
convoys in an effort to starve the city.12 The operation threatened to 
destroy the Jewish state before it started; indeed, until Abdul Khader's 
8. Approximately 1.5 to 1.7 million Palestinians live in Jordan, which has a total population 
of approximately 3.1 million. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACT BOOK 1990, at 
165. Most of those Palestinians are citizens of Jordan. Id. 
9. See, e.g., pp. 40-42 (detailing the December 1947 offensive by Zionist military organiza-
tions against Arab towns and villages). 
10. See L. CoLLINS & D. LAPIERRE, 0 JERUSALEM! 86-88, 133-39 (1972); see also D. 
KURZMAN, GENESIS 1948: TuE FIRST ARAB-lsRAELI WAR 69-75 (1970); B. MORRIS, supra 
note 3, at 61. 
The Arab Higher Committee also planned and executed terrorist attacks, including the 
bombings in Jerusalem of the Palestine Post, Ben-Yehuda Street, and the Jewish Agency. See, 
e.g., D. KURZMAN, supra, at 74-75. 
11. See L. CoLLINS & D. LAPIERRE, supra note 10, at 31-32, 61-62. Two other important 
roads, one from the Galilee in the north and the other from Negev in the south, had been com-
pletely cut off by Arab forces. D. KuRZMAN, supra note 10, at 202-03. 
12. D. KURZMAN, supra note 10, at 76-81. 
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death, the Arab raids were successful.13 
Quigley does not mention or challenge any of these accounts. Was 
the siege of Jerusalem a minor operation? Was Jerusalem a "Zionist 
settlement" or a "Jewish-populated town?" Did the Arab irregulars 
really operate without any guidance from the Arab Higher Commit-
tee?14 Quigley's account may, after all, be correct, but he gives no 
reason for believing that other commentators have their facts wrong, 
or that his omissions of otherwise well-known facts are legitimate. 
Consequently, it is difficult to regard Quigley's historical accounts as 
products of objective scholarship. 
After impugning Zionism and the legality of the Jewish settle-
ments, Quigley argues that the establishment of the state of Israel, in 
contrast to the settlement of Palestine, had no legal basis either. 
Again, violation of the right to self-determination forms the gravamen 
of each legal argument. Here, haphazard organization has its most 
telling and enervating effect on the book's thesis. For example, in Part 
l's final chapter, Quigley presents the argument that Resolution 181 
cannot justify the state of Israel - but he places his consideration of 
the claim of ancient title in a chapter in Part II, between chapters 
describing the 1948 war and his analysis of alternative justifications for 
the state. This scattershot presentation obscures the relation between 
these arguments. Perhaps a better organization would have treated 
these arguments in tum; this could have been done without detracting 
from the structural theme of land acquisition. 
Quigley's first rebuttal against Israel's legitimacy seeks to under-
mine any claim that Resolution 181 created or justified the state. Spe-
cifically, Quigley claims that Resolution 181 lacked binding force 
because the U.N. General Assembly is not a world legislature (p. 47). 
While this is one of Quigley's more convincing passages (because it 
both acknowledges and confronts several arguments to the contrary), 
he does not address the argument's consequences later in the book, 
when he relies in part on other General Assembly resolutions in argu-
ing that Israel illegally occupies the West Bank and Gaza Strip (pp. 
168-73). He cites, for example, a General Assembly resolution calling 
for an unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories 
occupied by Israel since 1967 (pp. 171-72). 
Indisputably, U.N. resolutions are nonbinding recommendations 
13. See L. CoLLINS & D. LAPIERRE, supra note 10, at 218-21, 242-43. At the strategically 
critical juncture known as the Bab-Al-Wad (Gate of the Valley), where the road from Tel Aviv 
begins its ascent of the Judean hills, the charred remains of convoy trucks can still be seen strewn 
beside the road. 
14. Quigley further confuses the issue by noting that irregulars attempted to blockade the 
Jewish Quarter in the Old City. P. 42. Most Jews lived outside the gates of the Old City. The 
siege of Jerusalem and the siege of the Old City were separate occurrences, the first of which 
Quigley does not even acknowledge. See D. KuRZMAN, supra note 10, at 343-402 for an ac-
count of the separate siege of the Old City. 
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(p. 47-53). However, Quigley fails to move beyond this obvious truth 
and investigate the legal or extra-legal status of recommendations. 
Perhaps such resolutions do have moral force. For example, even 
though Resolution 181 was not binding, it might nevertheless have 
provided a moral basis for a subsequent declaration of statehood by 
Israel. While that argument might weaken the claim against Israel's 
legitimacy, it might strengthen claims against Israel that rely on U.N. 
resolutions; for example, those decrying treatment of Palestinians in 
the occupied territories. 
Furthermore, ifthe U.N. resolutions had no moral force, then any 
subsequent claim that Israel should be reduced to its Partition borders 
is left practically groundless. This solution would then seem arbitrary. 
In any event, Israel never based its right to exist on Resolution 181 -
instead, Israel claimed title by historic right (p. 66). 
Quigley assails Israel's "historic right" claim, too. In essence, he 
argues that while the Palestinians have a right to self-determination, 
the Jews do not - time has extinguished the Jewish claim. This argu-
ment has a good measure of force. Despite the attachment Jews have 
always felt toward Israel, religious nostalgia hardly provides sufficient 
basis for claiming that Jews never lost legal title to Israel after an ab-
sence of a Jewish state in Palestine for nearly two thousand years. On 
the other hand, as the years go by, the same argument might just as 
well apply to the Palestinians. But Quigley refuses to explore fully this 
equally plausible possibility .15 
Finally, Quigley argues that Jews cannot justify the establishment 
of Israel as a fair response to Arab aggression. Israel must be regarded 
as the aggressor in the 1948 war and, hence, Israel cannot justify state-
hood on the basis of an Arab attack on the Jews living in Palestine (pp. 
73-81). Consequently, even if one accepts Israel's statehood, the terri-
tory it captured in 1948 outside of Partition lines was illegally ac-
quired (pp. 92-93). The principle basis for this claim is that Israel 
fought not for independence, but for more land. A similar argument 
undergirds the subsequent analysis of the Six Day War in Part IV of 
the book. 
Quigley's views of the causes of the 1948 and Six Day Wars contra-
dict the majority of scholarship on the issue.16 For example, Quigley 
15. Later in the book, Quigley admits that restoring all of Palestine to the Palestinians would 
be impractical, if not unjust (as an infringement of the rights of those Jews brought to live in 
Israel, often against their will). Pp. 211-12. He implies that enough time has passed to extin-
guish all of the Jews' ancient claims to Palestine- but not all of the Arabs' claims. The underly-
ing calculus for such a distinction remains unexplained. 
16. See, e.g., A. BARKER, ARAB-ISRAELI WARS 41-46 (1980); R. CHURCHILL & w. 
CHURCHILL, THE SIX DAY WAR 53-55 (1967); W. LAQUER, THE ROAD TO WAR 1967: THE 
ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CoNFLICT 241 (1968); N. SAFRAN, supra note 3, at 24-64. But 
see, e.g.. H. CATTAN, supra note 5, at 91-106; s. HADAWI, THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 
(CAUSE AND EFFECT) 5-7 (1969); D. HIRST, THE GUN AND THE OLIVE BRANCH 206-09 (2d ed. 
1984). 
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appears to believe (for this is one instance where it is unclear whether 
the author is making his own point or explaining someone else's) that 
invading forces of Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, and Iraq intervened in 
Palestine in 1948 in defense17 of the Palestinians: 
Egypt cited atrocities against the Palestine Arabs and a need to stop 
"Zionist terrorist gangs who persisted in attacking the peaceful Arab in-
habitants." Transjordan had been "compelled to enter Palestine to pro-
tect unarmed Arabs against massacres." ... The intervening states also 
stressed they were entering Palestine at [the Arab Higher Committee's] 
request. [p. 77; footnotes omitted] 
Yet Quigley presents no evidence to back the substance of these 
claims. The Arab states' other motivations for invasion, such as 
Transjordan's limited quest to annex Jerusalem, 18 are downplayed and 
obscured. Combined with Quigley's implication that the Jews pos-
sessed a vastly superior military force at the war's outset (pp. 38-39), 
Quigley's account of the war borders on the frivolous. 19 It is difficult 
to believe that any student of the war might conclude that the Jews 
were not responding to an invasion of their country, regardless of the 
propriety of the Arab invasion. Indeed, in the weeks before the war, 
the Arabs had vowed to "throw the Jews into the sea."20 As a result 
ofQuigley's haphazard and dubious accounts of the Arab-Israeli wars, 
some relatively stronger arguments for his position languish. Most no-
table is Israel's responsibility for the refugee problem, which Quigley 
analyzes yet again as a problem born of Jewish colonialist aggression. 
Quigley leaves unrebutted arguments made by other scholars, such as 
Benny Morris, that the refugee problem's causes were divers and de-
pended on place and time.21 
Finally, in addition to the parts of the book devoted to resolution 
of the conflict, Quigley offers an entire Part discussing Israel's treat-
ment of the Arabs (pp. 97-150). This Part does not serve the central 
theme of right to territory, or even relate to it. Instead, these chapters, 
in presenting a laundry list of Jewish "atrocities" ranging from taking 
Palestinian water to the policies of the Israeli housing bureaucracy, 
seek to add yet more baggage to "Zionism" - the baggage of racism. 
17. Quigley assumes that establishing the state of Israel was by itself an act of aggression; a 
fortiori, the "defense" of Israel was also aggressive. Thus the Arab armies "defended" Palestine. 
18. King Abdullah of Transjordan did not seek to destroy Israel. See L. CoLLINS & D. 
LAPIERRE, supra note 10, at 293, 384-85, 411. Indeed, Abdullah regarded the Jewish presence in 
Palestine as largely a positive one. Id. at 82. This view was shared by other Arabs, such as 
Syria's Emir Feisal. See J. STONE, supra note 3, at 138. However, Quigley omits these details as 
well. 
19. See, e.g., N. SAFRAN, supra note 3, at 44-50. Quigley's implication seems to ignore sun-
dry Arab advantages in firepower, organization, and so on, and belies Arab military successes at 
the beginning of hostilities. See id. at 50. As the war progressed, however, the balance of power 
clearly shifted toward the Israelis. Id. at 49. 
20. L. CoLLJNS & D. LAPIERRE, supra note 10, at 74. 
21. See B. MORRIS, supra note 3, at 294. 
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Of the seventeen (at least) instances where Quigley makes or cites 
comparisons of Zionism to apartheid,22 seven appear in this Part. The 
message is unmistakable: in oppressing Palestinians, Israel has gone 
beyond the mere denial of their right of self-determination. The Arab-
Israeli conflict is not only about land. 
Perhaps the book is therefore not about territorial rights, as it pro-
fesses in the preface, but about Zionism. In a sense, the characteriza-
tion of Zionism consumes this book, which is less a legal argument 
than an invective against Zionism. Quigley's ultimate, radical sug-
gested solutions23 only further this feeling. Some readers may be sym-
pathetic to that approach. Those seeking simply to learn more about 
the conflict, however, will be sorely d~sappointed. 
- James E. Hopenfeld 
22. See pp. 21, 107, 124-25, 128, 134, 143, 148-49, 181, 183, 188, 190-91, 213-14, 216, 219, 
223 &226. • 
23. Quigley suggests Israel should be expelled from the United Nations (p. 223); a court 
should be set up to restore Palestinians to their land or provide for compensation (p. 212); a 
Palestinian state should be created, not only on occupied territory but also on land acquired 
through war (pp. 228-32); and perhaps most significantly, Israel should relinquish its character 
as a Jewish state (p. 213). Furthermore, Quigley suggests that not only do other nations have the 
right to intervene on behalf of the Palestinians- they also have an obligation to do so. Pp. 220-
21. By this account, Saddam Hussein's Scud missile attack on Israel in January 1991 might 
actually have been legal. 
